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MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
REINSURANCE-THE THIRD PARTY'S RIGHTS AGAINST
THE REINSURER
I. INTRODUCTION
Insurance has been said to be a system for wide distribution of fortuitous
economic loss.' As a part of that system, reinsuranceO provides a means for even
wider distribution of the loss. When an insurer realizes that it has a great con-
centration of potential loss or liability exposure in one area, or where the loss or
liability it wishes to insure against is larger than it can handle, the burden can be
reduced by reinsuring. Among other things, the value of reinsurance in business
life has been said to be the ability to share possible liability, the spreading of
commitments, and the power or ability to accept large risks.3 There is a general
agreement today that reinsurance is beneficial to the general public as well as the
insurance companies.
Reinsurance has not been a prodigious source of legal writing. The rights of a
third party4 against the reinsurer have been the subject of even less comment.
The possible reasons for this seeming lack of interest are twofold. First, while the
history of reinsurance may be traced back many years,5 it is a relatively new
concept in this country. Second, the importance of reinsurance in our modern
society has probably been overlooked. However, the present increased use of rein-
1. KEETON, BASIC INSURANCE LAW 69 (1960).
2. "Reinsurance" should be distinguished from arrangements often desig-
nated as "reinsurance" but which in fact are not. These include: (a) coinsurance,
defined as a "relative division of risk between the insurer and the insured, depend-
ent upon the relative amount of the policy and actual value of the property in-
sured, and taking effect only when the actual loss is partial and less than the
amount of the policy for a loss equal to or in excess of that amount," BLACK,
LAW DICTIONARY 326 (4th ed. 1951); (b) double insurance, said to exist "when
a person who has already insured his property secures a second insurance upon
the same property," VANCE, INSURANCE 1067 (3d ed. 1951); and (c) substitution,
which is the arrangement made when "so-called 'reinsurers' engage to take the
place of the original insurer, and themselves directly to make good losses to the
holders of the original policies." VANCE, INSURANCE 1067 (3d ed. 1951).
For purposes of this comment, the following definition, given in Stickel v.
Excess Ins. Co. of America, 136 Ohio St. 49, 23 N.E.2d 839, 841 (1939), will be
used: "Reinsurance may be defined generally as a contract whereby one for a
consideration agrees to indemnify another wholly or partially against loss or liabil-
ity by reason of a risk the latter has assumed under a separate and distinct con-
tract as insurer of a third party."
3. TuoMvPSON, REINSURANCE 32-40 (3d ed. 1951).
4. In this article the following terminology will be used unless the contrary
is indicated. First, "policyholder" will be taken to mean the party to whom the
policy was issued originally. Second, "injured party" will refer to the party who is
injured by the policyholder and the person for whom the policyholder obtained
liability insurance protection. Third, "reinsured" is the insurance company which
originally issued a policy to the policyholder and the company which later reinsured
that policy with the reinsurance company. Finally, "reinsurer" will refer to the
reinsurance company itself.
5. THOMPSON, op. cit. supra note 3, at 32-40.
6. GOLDING, LAW AND PRACTICE OF REINSURANCE 6 (1948).
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surance, especially reinsurance of personal injury liability policies, has caused the
problem of a third party's rights against the reinsurer to arise with increased
frequency. It is the purpose of this comment to review the present law with re-
gard to this problem, along with the law as it has developed in analogous areas.
II. THE THIRD PAr'S RIGHTS AGAINST THE REINSURER: CASE LAW
A recent Missouri case7 set out the rule followed in most states, absent a
statute, in regard to a third party's rights against the reinsurer:
An ordinary contract of reinsurance, in absence of provisions to the con-
trary, operates solely as between the reinsurer and the reinsured. It
creates no privity between the original insured and the reinsurer. The con-
tract of insurance and the contract of reinsurance are totally distinct and
unconnected. s
The basis for this general rule was early laid when it was said that the laws
allowing reinsurance were for the benefit of the "whole company insured," and not
for the benefit of individual policyholders.9 The theory is that the original policy-
holder or the person injured by such policyholder is not a party to the contract,
and, because there is no privity, ° there can be no right of action, legal or equitable,
which exists in favor of the third party against the reinsurer11 The rule is not,
however, without exceptions; these will be discussed in detail below.
A. Exceptions to the General Rde: Construction of the Policy
In a great many cases concerning the rights of a third party under a rein-
surance contract, the following statement or its equivalent can be found:
It is true that typical reinsurance agreements do not operate in favor of
the original insured. They are merely contracts of indemnity of the insurer
and there is no privity of contract between the original insured and the
reinsurer. But nothing in the law forbids drafting reinsurance agreements
in special terms so that they will operate in favor of the original insured.12
7. O'Hare v. Pursell, 329 S.W.2d 614 (Mo. 1959).
8. Id. at 620. See generally 46 C.J.S. Insurance § 1232a (1946).
9. Casserly v. Manners, 48 How. Prac. 219, .modified conditionally, 9 Hun.
695 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1874).
10. In all the cases where privity is said to be absent, such absence is held
to be fatal to the third party's rights. This result is continually re-asserted without
a definition as to what is meant by privity. At the least, it means that the third
party is not a party to the contract, since that is the common factor in all the
cases where there is said to be no privity. For purposes of this comment, lack of
privity will be taken to mean that the third party is not a party to the contract.
11. See, e.g.. Stickel v. Excess Ins. Co. of America, supra note 2; 8 Coucr,
CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE 6794 (1931); Annots., 103 A.L.R. 1485 (1936), 35
A.L.R. 1348 (1925).
12. Bruckner-Mitchell Inc. v. Sun Indem. Co. of New York, 82 F.2d 434,
444 (D.C. App.), affirmed, 298 U.S. 677 (1935). See also Southwestern Surety
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Thus, there is no condemnation of reinsurance contracts drawn to operate in favor
of the third party. To the contrary, the courts have often found such "special
terms" in reinsurance contracts.
Various provisions in reinsurance contracts have been construed to give the
policyholder or injured party a direct action against the reinsurer.13 The more
common provisions are those: (a) by which the reinsurer contracts with the rein-
sured to assume the policies and to pay the holders thereof all such sums as the
reinsured may become liable to pay;14 and (b) where the reinsurer agrees to take
charge of and adjust all losses without expense to the reinsured, reserving the
right to make changes in the policies reinsured.15
The Missouri Supreme Court is among those which have turned to the rein-
surance contract to decide the question of the third party's rights against the rein-
sured. Thus, in the leading case of Homan v. Employers Reinsurance Corp.,16 the
court held that where the reinsurance contract was a contract of insurance against
liability, as distinguished from a contract of indemnity against loss, a person who
had recovered a judgment against the policyholder could maintain an action
against the reinsurer after the reinsured became insolvent and could not satisfy the
judgment against the policyholder. The court distinguished between contracts of
indemnity against loss and insurance against liability, stating:
In the former [contracts of indemnity against loss] the insurance com-
pany does not become liable until loss has actually been suffered and the
amount of the insurance does not become available until the assured has
paid the loss, whereas in the latter case [contracts of insurance against
liability] the obligation of the insurance company becomes fixed when the
liability attaches to the insured.17
While this distinction is referred to throughout the case, the opinion does not
make entirely clear whether a determination that a reinsurance contract was one
13. See Annots., 103 A.L.R. 1468, 1488 (1936), 35 A.L.R. 1351 (1925), for a
listing of such provisions. See generally 46 C.J.S. Insurance 217 (1946).
14. E.g., Ruohs v. Traders Fire Ins. Co., 78 S.W. 85 (Tenn. 1903); Shoaf v.
Palatine Ins. Co., 37 S.E. 451 (N. Car. 1901); Whitney v. American Ins. Co.,
59 Pac. 897 (Cal. 1900); Glen v. Hope Mut. Life Ins. Co., 56 N.Y. 379 (1874).
See generally 46 C.J.S. Insurance 218 (1946).
15. See generally 46 C.J.S. Insurance 218 (1946).
Some courts have allowed recovery by a policyholder or injured person under
what has erroneously been designated as a reinsurance contract. See, e.g., Coleman
Mut. Life Ins. Ass'n v. Lasseter, 173 S.W.2d 321 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943) (one
company transfered its business to another company and the transferee in con-
sideration thereof reinsured the risks of the transferor and contracted to pay losses
under the transferee's outstanding policies); Western Life Indem. Co. v. Bartlett,
145 N.E. 786 (Ind. App. 1924) (reinsurance agreement provided for issuance by
reinsurer of new policies to the new policyholders with the policyholders agreeing);
Fisher v. Hope Mut. Life Ins. Co., 69 N.Y. 161 (1877) (reinsurance agreement
providing that the reinsuring company was to accept premiums from the policy-
holder and keep the policy alive). Such arrangements are consistently referred to
as reinsurance but are not strict reinsurance contracts and will not be considered
in this comment.
16. 136 S.W.2d 289 (Mo. 1939).
17. Id. at 296.
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of insurance against liability would automatically give the third party the right to
maintain an action against the reinsurer after the insolvency of the reinsured. The
case has been said to stand for such a proposition.'8 However, the opinion also
asserts that "an insured may not bring an action at law against a reinsurer of the
risk under a strict contract of reinsurance because there is no privity of contract
between them."19 The court circumvented this rule by stating that because the
reinsurance contract provided that each reinsurance should be "subject to" all
terms and conditions of policies reinsured thereunder, the entire reinsurance con-
tract created a personal obligation of the reinsurer to the original insured. Be-
cause the reinsurer had taken charge of and managed the defense of the suit
against the original insured, the reinsurer was a "privy" to the action. This could
be construed to mean that in addition to finding that the reinsurance contract was
one of insurance against liability, the policyholder or injured party must show
that there was privity between him and the reinsurer.
At least one court has held that both factors must be present. In Melco
System v. Receivers of Trans-Anerica Ins. Co.,20 it was said that an "insolvency
clause" 21 converted what was otherwise a contract of indemnity against loss into a
contract of insurance against liability. However, as to the third party's rights,
the Alabama Supreme Court held that this was an ordinary reinsurance contract,
which would be construed as setting up no privity between the reinsurer and the
policyholder, and the fact that the policyholder might have relied upon a rein-
surance rider would not entitle him or his judgment creditor to maintain an action
directly against the reinsurer.22
The possible conflict between the Missouri and Alabama cases mentioned
above is made no clearer by other recent Missouri cases. In O'Hare v. Pursell,23
the Missouri Supreme Court was faced with the direct question of whether a find-
ing that a reinsurance contract was an insurance against liability would, taken
alone, be sufficient grounds for the third party to maintain an action against the
reinsurer. The court avoided a straight forward holding and simply reasserted the
principles of the Homan case, saying:
In fact, in any case where the contract of reinsurance is more than a mere
contract of indemnity, and is made for the benefit of the policyholders of
the reinsured, and by it the reinsurer assumes the liability of the latter
upon its policies, the liability of the reinsurer may be directly enforced
by the insured or by his privies.24
18. 46 C.J.S. Insurance 219 (1946).
19. 136 S.W.2d at 296.
20. 268 Ala. 152, 105 So. 2d 43 (1958).
21. An "insolvency clause" is a provision required by statute in many states to
be inserted in a liability policy, in effect providing that the insolvency of the policy-
holder shall not affect the obligation of the insurance company to the injured
party. A similar clause has been enacted in a very few states in regard to rein-
surance.
22. 105 So. 2d at 45.
23. Supra note 7.
24. Supra note 7, at 620.
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However, the court did not repudiate such a theory, and even implied that it will
be followed by the Missouri courts. For this reason, it is necessary to determine
what various courts have found to constitute a contract of indemnity against loss
as opposed to a contract insuring against liability.
B. Reinsurance Contracts: Indemnification for Loss or Insurance Against Liability?
A few courts have said that "an ordinary contract of reinsurance is one of
indemnity against loss, and no action will lie until the loss has been paid" 25 How-
ever, the general rule would seem to be to the contrary. A majority of the re-
ported cases indicate that unless the reinsurance contract specifically and unequiv-
ocally provides for indemnification for loss only, the courts will view such con-
tracts as obligating the reinsurer to pay the reinsured the whole loss regardless of
whether the reinsured has incurred a loss or merely a liability.26
The leading case supporting the majority rule is Allemannia Ins. Co. v. Fire-
men's Ins. Co.27 In that case the reinsured had become insolvent by reason of the
filing of a vast number of claims by its policyholders after a large fire in Baltimore.
The reinsured could not satisfy these claims unless the reinsurer paid the rein-
sured; the reinsurer would not pay the reinsured until the reinsured paid the
claims. Upon appeal by the defendant reinsurance company, the United States
Supreme Court held that the contract was one of insurance against liability and
not of indemnity against loss. The Court observed that:
It is not necessary that the reinsured should first pay the loss to the
party first insured before proceeding against the reinsurer upon his con-
tract. The liability of the latter is not affected by the insolvency of the
insured or by its inability to fulfill its own contract with the original
insured.28
The Court reached this result despite a provision in the contract that the rein-
sured was to forward to the reinsurer a statement of the date and probable amount
of loss or damage, and, after having adjusted, accepted proofs or paid such loss or
damage, was to forward the proofs and a copy of the original receipts taken upon
payment of the loss.
The case usually cited in support of the contrary view is Fidelity & Deposit
Co. v. Pink.29 In that case the reinsured issued a fidelity bond and immediately
reinsured half the risk with the reinsurer. The policyholder sustained a loss; while
this was in the course of adjustment, the reinsured was adjudged insolvent. The
reinsurer refused to pay half the claim as demanded by Pink, the Superintendent
of Insurance. Pink thereupon instituted proceedings against the reinsurer. The
United States Supreme Court reversed the lower court's judgment for Pink, stating:
25. Ibid.
26. See, e.g., Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930); Hicks v. Poe, 269
U.S. 118 (1925); French Mut. Soc'y v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 203 Fed.
558 (D. Md. 1913); Globe Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. American Bonding & Cas. Co.,
195 N.W. 728 (Iowa 1923). See generally Annot., 35 A.L.R. 1341 (1946).
27. 209 U.S. 326 (1908).
28. Id. at 334.
29. 302 U.S. 224 (1937), rehearing denied, 302 U.S. 780 (1938).
[Vol. 28
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We do not question the general rules concerning the liability of reinsurers
announced in the Allemannia case; but the liability under any written
contract must be determined upon consideration of the words employed,
read in the light of the attending circumstances. Here the two insurance
companies stood upon an equal footing; both were experts in the field.
The language used differs materially from that found in the Allemannia
case.3 0
The Allemannia policy declared that the company "hereby agrees to reinsure,"
while the standard form of reinsurance agreement used in the Pink case provided
that "the reinsurer does hereby reinsure against LOSS." The Supreme Court was
of the opinion that the parties adopted the language in the Pink policy intending
to impose liability different from that found to exist in the Allemannia case, espe-
cially in view of the fact that the language of the standard form in the Pink case
was adopted twenty years after the Allemannia decision. Thus the Pink case
approved the practice of limiting liability by reinsuring only against loss and not
against liability, provided that the contract sufficiently spells out that the rein-
surer is liable only when the reinsured has actually paid for losses incurred by
policyholders or injured parties. This hardly seems to support the view that the
ordinary contract of reinsurance is one of indemnity against loss, unless the con-
tract has provisions which specifically limit the reinsurer's obligation.S1 Despite
this, some courts cite the Pink case as supporting such a rule.
The Missouri courts seem to have adopted the minority rule-that ordinarily
a contract of reinsurance is one of indemnity against loss only, unless the contract
contains provisions to the contrary.3 2 However, where the provisions in a rein-
surance contract are ambiguous, a different result may be reached. Evidence of
this is found in the Homan case itself. The Missouri Supreme Court there said:
"If a policy of insurance contains such general language in reference to indemnity
or liability as to be ambiguous and uncertain, the policy will be declared as in-
suring against liability. .... ,,3
Many instances have been found where reinsurance contracts were construed
as insuring against liability.34 Among them are contracts which provided that "Loss,
if any payable pro rata at the same time the reinsured pays."35 It has likewise
been held that the obligation of a reinsurer is not affected by the inability of the
30. 302 U.S. at 225.
31. See, e.g., Fischer v. Excess Ins. Co. of America, 115 F.2d 755 (8th Cir.
1940); Stickel v. Excess Ins. Co. of America, supra note 2; Clark County v.
Bergstresser, 233 N.W. 276 (S. Dak. 1930).
32. See Homan v. Employer's Reinsurance Corp., supra note 16.
33. Ibid.
34. See 31 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE 469 (1943); 8 CoucH,
CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW 7414 (1931).
35. Allemannia Fire Ins. Co. v. Firemen's Ins. Co., supra note 27; Ex parte
Norwood, 18 Fed. Cas. 452 (No. 10,364) (N.D. Ill. 1873); Blackstone v. Alleman-
nia Fire Ins. Co., 56 N.Y. 104 (1874).
19631
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reinsured to fulfill its own contracts with its policyholders; 6 this has been affirmed
even when the contract referred to sums "actually paid.137
C. Exceptions to the General Ride: Third Party Beneficiary Theory
Where the courts have recognized a right in the third party to maintain an
action against the reinsurer, they usually do so under an application of the third
party beneficiary theory.38 This rule is an equitable rule, adopted for convenience
and to avoid circuity of action and the formality of an assignment by the original
debtor of the new agreement with him. It is said to be determined strictly in
accordance with the intention of the parties to create a liability in favor of a
third party.0
Despite the liberality of some courts in applying the third party beneficiary
concept, it has seldom been applied to reinsurance contracts. The more common
reasons given for the failure to apply the concept to reinsurance are: (a) it would
be contrary to long standing commercial practice; (b) the law is settled on the
matter and the doctrine of stare decisis prevents any change; and (c) to allow
a suit by third parties would lead to a multitude of litigation and might result in
preferring one creditor over another.40
A further limitation upon the application of the third party beneficiary theory
to reinsurance results from strict enforcement of the common law requirement of
"intention to benefit" the third party.41 This requirement demonstrates the im-
portance of the initial determination of whether the reinsurance contract is one
of indemnity against loss or insurance against liability.
Despite the reluctance of the courts to apply third party beneficiary theories
to reinsurance, it is the principal theory used to aid the policyholder or injured
party. For this reason, the law of third party beneficiary contracts will be examined
in light of the ordinary reinsurance contract.
36. Hicks v. Poe, supra note 26; Globe Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. American Bond-
ing & Cas. Co., 217 N.W. 268, 270 (Iowa 1928); Home v Mut. Safety Ins. Co.,
2 N.Y. 235 (1837).
37. Allemannia Fire Ins. Co. v. Firemen's Ins. Co., supra note 27.
38. See, e.g., Whitney v. American Ins. Co., 56 Pac. 50 (Cal. 1899); Weil v.
Federal Land Ins. Co., 106 N.E. 246 (Ill. 1914); Shoaf v. Palatine Ins. Co., supra
note 14; Milborne v. Royal Beneficial Soc'y, 43 N.Y.Supp. 1026 (App. Div. 1897);
Travelers Ins. Co. v. California Ins. Co., 45 N.W. 703 (N. Dak. 1890); American
Bonding Co. v. American Surety Co., 103 S.E. 599 (Vir. 1920).
39. For an excellent discussion of the present law on third party beneficiary
contracts, see Comment, 57 COLUM. L. REv. 407 (1957). Much of the discussion
in this comment on third party beneficiary contracts will be drawn from that
article and frequent reference will be made to it.
40. See, e.g., Gutride v. General Reinsurance Co., 4 N.Y.S.2d 386 (App. Div.
1938); Sofia Bros. v. General Reinsurance Co., 274 N.Y.Supp. 565 (Sup. Ct. 1934);
Casserly v. Manners, 48 How.Pr. 219 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1874). See generally Price
v. Easton, 4 B. & Ad. 433 (K.B. 1833), where virtually all the traditional common
law arguments against the judicial enforcement of third party beneficiary interests
appear.
41. See Commedt, 57 COLUM. L. REv. 407, 408.
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1. Common Law Doctrine
If a third party beneficiary of a contract is specifically named, and the con-
tract contains an express obligation to pay the named person, most courts will
allow the beneficiary to enforce the contract.42 The fact that the contract is a rein-
surance agreement should not alter this rule.43 When the nature of the contract is
not so clear, however, difficulty arises.
Some courts have made the intention of the parties determinative. In most
cases, all this can mean is that the court or jury will decide what the intent was,
basing their decision upon the evidence introduced.
Even greater uncertainty results from the various approaches taken as to the
intention test. Thus, one line of cases has held that if the contract appears to im-
pose a duty or create a right in favor of the third party, there is a presumption
that the contracting parties intended to confer a benefit upon him." Under this
view, if the reinsurance contract is one insuring against liability, and it appears to
impose a duty on the reinsurer to make payment to the third party, then that party
should have the benefit of the presumption. Other courts have taken a more
restrictive approach, saying that the parties will be presumed to contract only for
themselves and not for the benefit of any third party, unless such intent can be
clearly shown. 45 This view would probably prevent a suit by the third party
against the reinsurer, absent contractual provisions or other evidence to rebut the
presumption.
The obviously unsatisfactory nature of such subjective standards has led to
the use of a more objective approach.46 Under this theory, the courts have
distinguished between "intention" and "purpose." "Intention" is used objectively,
to refer to the necessary effect of the contract, while "purpose" means the sub-
jective motives attributable to the parties making the contract.47 In applying this
concept, the intention as gathered from the contract is controlling, and it is of no
consequence that the "purpose" of the promisee in exacting the promise may have
been solely to gain some benefit or immunity for himself rather than to benefit the
42. Massachusetts is the only jurisdiction which refuses to recognize the
third party beneficiary theory in some manner or another. See, e.g., Gustafson v.
Doyle, 109 N.E.2d 475 (Ohio 1952); Mellen v. Whipple, 67 Mass. (1 Gray) 317
(1854).
43. See cases cited supra note 38.
44. Hamill v. Maryland Cas. Co., 209 F.2d 338 (10th Cir. 1954); Ohio Cas.
Ins. Co. v. Beckwith, 74 F.2d 75, 78 (5th Cir. 1934); Daniel-Morris Co. v. Glens
Falls Indem. Co., 126 N.E.2d 750 (N.Y. 1955). The cases indicate that this view
is used when there is a promise to discharge the promisor's duty to a third party.
If the reinsurance contract is one insuring against liability, then the promise could
be implied if not expressly contained in the contract.
45. Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. Knox, 184 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. 1944); Burke v.
Scott, 237 S.W.2d 655 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
46. See e.g., RESTATEMENT, CONTRAcTs §§ 20-23 (1932).
47. See Jackman Cigar Mfg. Co. v. John Berger Co., 52 N.E.2d 363 (Ind.
1944); Vikingstad v. Baggot, 282 P.2d 824 (Wash. 1955).
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third party.48 This approach would seem especially well suited to reinsurance con-
tracts. Usually the reinsured's primary purpose is not to benefit the third party,
but rather to protect itself from unexpectedly large liability or loss which might
otherwise render it insolvent. Despite this, in looking at "intention" objectively,
it is seen that the necessary effect of the contract is to benefit the third party.
The reinsured must necessarily have an intent to benefit the third party, since
otherwise its purpose of reducing its liability or loss would not be effectuated. This
approach is the more modern view adopted by the Restatement of Contracts.
Other states have seen fit to deviate from the strict intention to benefit test,
some taking a liberal approach and some a strict approach. The strict views in-
clude the requirement that there be a clear promise made, expressly stated to be
for the third party's benefit,49 the view that it is necessary to show an intention
to grant the third party beneficiary the legal right to enforce the promise, 5° and a
degree of benefit test.51 Under these approaches, few cases have been found in
which the reinsurance contract could be construed as a third party beneficiary
contract.
Some of the more liberal tests used are that a third party may maintain an
action on a contract for his benefit when he has a direct financial, legal or equita-
ble interest in its performance; 52 that recovery by the third party will be allowed
when it would tend to accomplish the "basic purposes" of the contract; 58 and the
most liberal view, that any person having a beneficial interest in the contract can
maintain an action thereon.54 Under these approaches, the ordinary reinsurance
contract would usually be construed as a third party beneficiary contract. The
policyholder or injured party certainly has a "financial interest" in the reinsurance
contract. Likewise, one of the "basic" purposes of the reinsurance contract is to
relieve the reinsured of some of its liabilities. It follows that to allow a third party
to maintain an action against the reinsurer will relieve the reinsured of its liability
to that person and thus accomplish one of the "basic purposes." Finally, there
can be little doubt that the third party has a "beneficial interest" in the rein-
surance contract, regardless of how it is drawn.
48. Note that this approach can result in nullifying a clear understanding be-
tween the parties that no cause of action was to be established in the third party.
See Shoaf v. Palatine Ins. Co., supra note 14.
49. See, e.g., McGrath v. Bagley, 76 N.Y.S.2d 298 (App. Div. 1948); Citizens
Nat'l Bank v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 150 S.W.2d 1003 (Tex. 1941).
50. See, e.g., Schlicht v. Wengert, 15 A.2d 911 (Md. 1940); Borough of
Brooklawn v. Brooklawn Housing Corp., 11 A.2d 83 (N.J. 1940).
51. Maumee Valley Elec. Co. v. Toledo, 13 F.2d 98, 104 (6th Cir. 1926);
Brill v. Brill, 127 Atl. 840 (Penn. 1925).
52. E.g., Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Wadsworth Elec. Mfg. Co., 29 S.W.2d
650 (Ky. 1930).
53. See Note, 31 TEXAS L. Rav. 210, 211 (1952).
54. See, e.g., Hamill v. Maryland Cas. Co., 209 F.2d 338 (10th Cir. 1954);
Merchants Loan & Trust Co. v. Ummach, 228 Ill. App. 67 (1923). For further
discussion of the views and cases cited in notes 42 through 66, see Comment, 57
CoLUm. LAW REv. 406, 408-14 (1957).
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2. The Restatement View
The American Law Institute has taken the position that where performance
of a promise will benefit a person other than the promisee, that person is a "donee
beneficiary if it appears from the terms of the promise in view of the accompanying
circumstances that the purpose of the promisee . . . is to make a gift to the
beneficiary." 5 He is a "creditor beneficiary if no purpose to make a gift appears
...and performance of the promise will satisfy an actual or supposed or asserted
duty of the promisee to the beneficiary." 50 All persons not donee or creditor bene-
ficiaries are called "incidental beneficiaries," and have no right against the parties
to the contract.
In applying the Restatement view, some courts have found room for a very
liberal construction of contracts. Even though no actual promise for the benefit
of the third person appears, courts have implied such a promise after finding an
intent to benefit from the contract and its surrounding circumstances. 7 Other
courts have found that the promised performance would discharge a duty of the
promisee to a third party and thus that the contract was for the benefit of the
third party.58
Applying the Restatement view to reinsurance contracts, the third party
would be a creditor beneficiary, since the purpose of the reinsurance contract is
not to make a gift to the insured person but is to satisfy the duty owed by the
insured to the third party under the original primary policy. The policyholder is a
creditor beneficiary because his premiums helped pay for the reinsurance. While
the Restatement rules in regard to third party beneficiary contracts have been
soundly criticized, 59 when they are followed by a court the necessary result is a
finding that the third party is a creditor beneficiary of the reinsurance contract
and can recover thereon from the reinsurer.
3. The Missouri Law60
In Missouri the third party beneficiary concept has been applied to reinsurance
contracts.61 The test often applied in cases other than those involving reinsurance
seems to be the "intent to benefit" concept, with some cases apparently imposing
an additional requirement that the promisee owe the intended beneficiary some
55. See RESTATEMENT, CoNTRACTs §§ 135, 136 (1932) for the classification of
donee, creditor, and incidental beneficiaries.
56. Id. at 133(b).
57. Knight v. Fox Caldwell Theaters Corp., 212 P.2d 1027 (Idaho 1949);
James Steward & Co. v. Law, 228 S.W.2d 601 (Tex. Civ. App.), aff'd, 233 S.W.2d
558 (Tex. 1950).
58. I.P.C. Distributors, Inc. v. Chicago Moving Picture Mach. Operators
Union, 132 F.Supp. 294 (N.D.Ill. 1955).
59. See Comment, 57 COLUM. L. REv. 406, 415 (1957).
60. See Comment, 25 Mo. L. REv. 71 (1960), for a good discussion of the
Missouri law on third party beneficiary contracts generally.
61. O'Hare v. Pursell, 329 S.W.2d 614 (Mo. 1959); Homan v. Employers
Reinsurance Corp., 136 S.W.2d 289 (Mo. 1939).
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legal or equitable duty.6 2 Under Missouri law, the intent to confer a benefit on a
third party must be essential to the accomplishment of the objective sought by the
parties to the agreement.63 Therefore, it is arguable that the view indicated by
the Homan case is proper under Missouri's third party beneficiary view, and that
the reinsurance contract which insures against liability is a third party beneficiary
contract, since the conferring of a benefit upon the third party is essential to the
objective of the contracting parties-to relieve the reinsured of a portion of its
liability to the third party.
III. STATUTORY SOLUTIONS
A. Statutes Dealing Directly with the Rights of Parties to a Reinsurance Contract
Missouri has a statute providing that an action shall be brought by the real
party in interest0 4 The same statute also grants to the promisee the right to main-
tain an action on a third party beneficiary contract. This statute was construed
in Ellis v. Harrison5 as impliedly allowing the beneficiary to bring an action in
his own name. Other jurisdictions have statutes of various description which allow
suit by a third party to enforce his rights under a contract made for his benefit.68
Most statutes of this sort however, are of a general nature, as is the Missouri
statute, applying to all contracts regardless of subject matter. Loose wording
usually results in their being of little practical aid in the reinsurance area.
There is very little legislation which either expressly permits a policyholder
or injured party to maintain an action against the reinsurer,67 or expressly pro-
hibits such direct action.6 8 The legislation which does grant such rights usually
provides that the original insured may have the same rights and that the rein-
surer will be obligated to the same extent as under the original contract, with the
rights and obligations being fixed as a part of the reinsurance contract. 9
Most of the legislation dealing with the rights of parties to a reinsurance con-
tract has been directed toward nullifying the effect of the Pink case. Thus, some
62. See Devers v. Howard, 46 S.W. 625 (Mo. 1898); City of St. Louis ex rel.
Glencoe Lime and Cement Co. v. Von Phul, 34 S.W. 843 (Mo. 1896); Farris v.
Pitts, 300 S.W. 840 (K.C. Ct. App. 1927); Uhrich v. Globe Sur. Co., 166 S.W.
845 (K.C. Ct. App. 1914).
63. See Comment, 25 Mo. L. REv. 71 (1960).
64. § 507.010, RSMo 1959.
65. 16 S.W. 198 (Mo. 1891). See WILLISTON, CONTRACrs § 366 (3d ed. 1960)
where it is said that this statute confers a right on the third party to maintain an
action on the contract. However, little reference has been made to the statute in
the Missouri cases. Cf. Wilson & Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 254 S.W. 266 (Mo.
1923).
66. CAL. CiV. CODE ANN. § 1559 (West 1954); GA. CODE ANN. § 3-108 (1936);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 29-102 (1948); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 1890 (West 1952);
Mic. Comp. LAws § 691.541-42 (1948); MoNT. REv. CODES ANN. § 13-204 (1947);
N.D. REV. CODE § 9-0204 (1943); N.J. REv. STAT. §§ 26-3.6 (1937); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, § 29 (1937).
67. See IND. STAT. ANN. § 39-421 (1952).
68. See CAL. INs. CODE ANN. § 623 (West); N.D. CENr. CODE ANN. § 26-05-
04 (1959).
69. See Federal Land Ins. Co. v. Risinger, 91 N.E. 533 (Ind. App. 1910).
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states have put the decision of the Allemannia case into statutory form. Such
statutes ordinarily provide that "a reinsurance contract is presumed to be a con-
tract of indemnity against liability and not merely against damage." 70 However,
the greatest amount of legislation in this area has been patterned after the New
York statute, requiring, in effect, that any reinsurance contract be one insuring
against liability rather than indemnifying against loss. 71 The New York statute
is not mandatory in form. It is effective, however, because it prohibits credit for
reinsurance being allowed as an asset to any reinsured unless the reinsurance is
payable on the liability of the reinsured without dimunition because of the insol-
vency of the reinsured.72 The New York legislation, as originally enacted in 1939,
required that the reinsurance be made payable to the liquidator or receiver of the
insolvent insurer.73 In 1940, however, the statute was amended so as to make no
distinction as to the recipient of payment.7 4
Other states have adopted similar legislation, in order to preclude a windfall
for the reinsurer when the reinsurance contract is drawn so as to fall within the
rationale of the Pink case.75 Unfortunately, instances of such legislation are scat-
tered, and in most states any statutory aid must be by way of analogy, if at all.
B. Analogous Statutes Bearing on a Third Party's Rights Against the Reinsurer
Early in the history of liability insurance in this country, certain courts held
that a policyholder under an indemnity policy had not suffered a "loss" which
entitled him to recover from his insurer until he had been obliged by law to pay,
and had in fact paid, a judgment rendered against him. Such an interpretation,
when insisted upon by the insurer, placed the policyholder in the position of being
unable to enforce his policy if it was impossible for him first to pay the judgment?"
At common law, the right of an injured third party to recover in any way against
the insurer of the tortfeasor on a voluntary liability insurance policy was likewise
extremely limited.77 Such a right depended upon whether the policy was a contract
to insure the negligent party against liability, or merely to indemnify him against
loss. 7 8 When the policy was construed as a contract of indemnity against loss, then
insolvency of the insured was a complete defense to the insurer, since loss by the
70. See CAL. INs. CODE ANN. § 621 (West); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 26-05-02
(1959).
71. N.Y. INS. LAWS § 77 (1949). For a history and discussion of this act,
see Comment, 41 COLUM. L. Ruv. 353 (1941).
72. Note that the instant clause applies to reinsurance. Most states have
similar clauses applicable to liability insurance in the event of policyholder in-
solvency.
73. N.Y. LAWS 1939, c. 882, § 77,
74. An argument could be made that such an amendment was a recognition
by the New York legislature of a third party's need to maintain an action on the
contract of reinsurance in given instances.
75. See, e.g., ILL. ANN: STAT. c. 73, 1950 Cum. Ann. Pocket Part, § 785 (b).
76. SAWYER, Atrro LIABILITy INSURANCE 2 (1940).
77. See VANCE, INSURANCE § 135 (3d ed. 1951).
78. See, e.g., Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Beckwith, 74 F.2d 75 (5th Cir. 1935). See
also Comment, 9 CORNELL L.Q. 329 (1924).
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insured was precluded. 9 Under such contracts, the injured party received very
little consideration, either under the contract or from the courts. The burden of
death and injury had to be borne by the person injured or by the dependents of
the victim of the accident1 0 While the courts were sympathetic, few of them
offered any relief for such third persons.8'
Despite, however, the unfavorable treatment originally accorded by courts to
injured parties under ordinary liability policies, some few courts, by various means,
not all of which were entirely logical, fashioned remedies for the injured third
party.82 To combat this, the insurance companies began to insert "no action"
clauses in their policies. The most effective clauses were patterned after the fol-
lowing:
No action shall lie against the company to recover for any loss or expense
under this policy, unless it shall be brought by the assured for loss or ex-
pense actually sustained and paid in money by him after trial of issue.82
Such clauses were given effect by the great majority of courts, so that the insurer
was not liable to the assured until the judgment against him was paid.84
In comparing the above situation with the present law on reinsurance, a marked
analogy is seen. In both instances, courts have held that before the insured or rein-
sured could recover upon an indemnity against loss contract, an actual loss must
have been incurred. In both instances, the insolvency of the party primarily liable
precluded satisfaction of the injured party's judgment. In both cases, the grounds
of refusal to aid the third party were that such third party was neither a party
nor a privy to the contract. In both cases, the courts generally refused to give the
third party any help.85 Furthermore, one cannot help but notice the analogy be-
tween "no action" clauses and the clauses which could be placed in reinsurance con-
tracts following the Pink case; in both areas the courts left the insurance companies
free to indemnify against loss only rather than to insure against liability.
The basic effect was the same in both areas. The widespread use of the "no
action" clauses precluded any recovery by the injured party in the event of in-
79. Hollings v. Brown, 80 So. 792 (Ala. 1922); Frye v. Bath Gas Co., 54 AtI.
395 (R.I. 1903); Cayard v. Robertson, 131 S.W. 864 (Tenn. 1937); Annot., 37
A.L.R. 637, 644 (1924).
80. See Laube, The Social Vice of Accident Indemnity, 80 PA. LAW REv. 189
(1931).
81. "Of course, however much we may sympathize with appellant in this
case, we cannot allow that sympathy to lead us astray or to do otherwise than to
administer the law as it exists." In re Harrington Motor Co., Ltd., [1928] 1 Ch.
105, 124.
82. See, e.g., Cappelle v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 120 Atl. 556 (N.H.
1922); Fenton v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 56 Pac. 1096 (Ore. 1899); Taxicab Motor
Co. v. Pacific Coast Cas. Co., 132 Pac. 393 (Wash. 1913).
83. Patterson v. Adan, 138 N.W. 281, 284 (Minn. 1912).
84. COOLEY, BRIEFS ON INSURANCE 5696 (2d ed. 1927).
85. See generally Bain v. Atkins, 63 N.E. 414 (Mass. 1902); Hermance v.
Globe Indem. Co., 223 N.Y.Supp. 93 (App. Div. 1927); Stidbom v. Brown-Corliss
Engine Co., 119 N.W. 308 (Wis. 1909). For the cases on reinsurance, see generally
46 C.J.S. Insurance § 123a (1946).
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solvency or bankruptcy of the insured policyholder. In cases of insolvency, the only
one who benefited from the policy was the insurer.8 6 The same is true of the
reinsurance contract that is held to be merely a contract of indemnity against loss.
In such case, only the reinsurance company benefits.
Carrying the analogy to its final point, it will be noted that a minority of
courts have construed reinsurance contracts so as to give them effect as contracts
to insure against liability whenever possible. Likewise, a minority of courts have
used subterfuges to avoid the consequences of the "no action" clause in the area
being discussed.87 The subterfuge most often engaged in is that when the insurance
company assumes the defense of the tortfeasor, this is inconsistent with the "no
action" clause, and in some manner nullifies the effect of the clause.88
At this point the analogy ends. Dissatisfaction with the then present state of
the law, including court approval of "no action" clauses, led to legislation in many
states, enabling the injured party to reach the insurance proceeds due the insolvent
tortfeasor. But, as indicated earlier, there is a dearth of similar legislation aiding
the third party in the reinsurance area.
Legislation nullifying "no action" clauses and similar restrictive contract pro-
visions is of two types.8 9 The first type, enacted in at least six states,90 is patterned
after the Massachusetts statute,91 which provides that an insurance company's
liability is absolute whenever an injury covered by a casualty policy occurs. This
means that the liability of the insurance company does not depend upon satisfac-
tion of the final judgment by the insured. Further, the Massachusetts act allows the
injured party to proceed in equity to reach the insurance money if his judgment
against the tortfeasor has not been satisfied within thirty days.
Many other states92 have followed the New York type of legislation,93 which
provides that the policy must contain a provision that insolvency or bankruptcy
of the policyholder will not release the insurer. That statute also provides that a
judgment by the injured party against the tortfeasor is still necessary, but that an
action may be brought against the insurer if the injured party's judgment is not
satisfied within thirty days. There is no question as to the constitutionality of
either type of legislation, since courts have long recognized that the business of acci-
86. See Comment, 36 DIcK. L. REv. 173, 179 (1932).
87. See Laube, supra note 80.
88. See Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. Hancock, 169 So. 617 (Fla. 1936); Pat-
terson v. Adan, supra note 83; Elliot v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 161 N.W. 579 (Neb.
1917); West v. MacMillan, 152 Atl. 104 (Penn. 1930).
89. For a thorough discussion of these statutes, see Comment, 46 HARv. L.
REV. 1325 (1933); Comment, 28 ILL. L. REV. 688 (1934); Annot., 85 A.L.R. 20
(1933).
90. ALA. CODE tit. 28, § 11 (1958); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 4231 (1930); ME.
REV. STAT. c. 60 99 117-180 (1930); §§ 379.195, 379.200, RSMo 1959; OHIo GEN.
CODE ANN. §§ 9510-3, 9510-4 (1935).
91. MAss. GEN. LAws c. 175 §§ 112, 113; c. 214 § 3(10) (1932).
92. Some of the early states enacting such legislation include Arkansas, Cali-
fornia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, Vermont and Virginia.
93. N.Y. INs. LAws § 109.
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dent indemnity is of a peculiar nature and intimately connected with the general
welfare. 0
Are such statutes applicable to the reinsurance problem? Looking closely at a
representative statute,95 it will be seen that the language is general and, prima fade,
indeed applicable to reinsurance. The typical statutory language refers to "every
contract of insurance made between an insurance company and any person, firm
or corporation. . . ." Further, the intent of the legislature, as evidenced by the
history of the legislation, would lend weight to the argument that such legislation
should be applied to reinsurance contracts.
In connection with legislation prohibiting "no action" clauses, some con-
sideration should also be given to the statutes which authorize reinsurance con-
tracts. Reinsurance contracts were early recognized as valid at common law.96 In
addition, nearly all states have statutes authorizing reinsurance. It is submitted
that such legislation is for the benefit of the policyholder and injured party. An
indication of this legislative intent can be found in statements such as the following:
Another 1917 proposal would have created a board . . . to reinsure the
risks in the state life fund if necessary to protect the interests of the policy-
holders.07
Since the statutes prohibiting "no action" clauses and the statutes authorizing
reinsurance were both enacted for the primary purpose of protecting the third
party, they should be construed as being pani materia. Thus, when considering
reinsurance contracts which are sanctioned by statutory enactment, reference
should also be had to "no action" legislation, since both statutes evince a legislative
intent to protect the person who originally sought protection-the policyholder.
The United States Supreme Court was of the opinion that the Missouri
statute prohibiting "no action" clauses applied to reinsurance contracts. In Brill-
hart v. Excess Co. of America, the Court said:
94. See, e.g., Merchants Liab. Co. v. Smart, 267 U.S. 126 (1925); Lorando
v. Gethro, 228 Mass. 181 (1914).
95. § 379.195, RSMo 1959.
In respect to every contract of insurance . . . between an insurance com-
pany, person, firm or association . . . and any person, firm or corporation
by which such person, firm or corporation . . . is insured against loss or
damage . . . the liability of the insurance company, if liability there be,
shall become absolute, and the payment of said loss shall not depend upon
the satisfaction by the assured of a final judgment against him for loss,
or damage or death, or if insured becomes insolvent or discharged in
bankruptcy during the period that the policy is in operation or any part
is due or unpaid, occasioned by such casualty.
§ 379.200, RSMo 1959:
Upon the recovery of a final judgment against any person . . . the judg-
ment creditor shall be entitled to have the insurance money, provided for
in the contract of insurance ... and if the judgment is not satisfied within
thirty days after the date when it is rendered, the judgment creditor may
proceed in equity against the defendant and the insurance company to
reach and apply the insurance money to the satisfaction of the judgment.
96. 17 Wend. 359 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1837).
97. KIMBALL, INSURANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 145 (1960).
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By statute the liability of the insurance company becomes absolute when
loss occurs; and judgment against the insured establishes privity of con-
tract between the injured party and the reinsurer9 s
This would seem to be the literal interpretation of the statute, in addition to
being the interpretation which would effectuate the intent of the legislature.
However, at least three courts which have passed upon the question have
held that such statutes do not establish the required privity between the reinsurer
and the third party. Thus, in G-urthie v. General Reinsurance Corp., a New York
court refused to apply Section 109 of the New York Insurance Law to a reinsur-
ance contract, saying:
That section is in derogation of the common law. The liability of the in-
surer to the claimant excludes the liability of a reinsurer under the rule of
strict construction.100
The same result was reached in Stickel v. Excess Ins. Co.,1O1 an Ohio decision. The
latest case, Melco System v. Receivers of Trans-America Ins. Co.,1Ol discussed
previously, likewise held that the legislation in question did not apply to reinsur-
ance contracts and created no privity between the reinsurer and the third party.
In Missouri, the Homan case touched upon the matter but did not decide it.103
Thus, at the present time the authority is divided. On the other hand, rel-
atively few courts have actually passed upon the question. For those courts which
have not yet aligned themselves, it is submitted that to allow a reinsurance con-
tract of indemnity against loss only, so that the third party will not be compen-
sated in event of insolvency of the reinsured, is in direct conflict with the social
policy behind the legislation prohibiting "no action" clauses, and the legislation
authorizing and sanctioning the use of reinsurance. Likewise, for a court to deny
recovery to the third party because of lack of privity, even though it be found
that the reinsurance contract is one of indemnity against liability, thwarts the leg-
islative intent and the social policy behind both types of statutes.
IV. POLIcY QUESTIONS
A. Should the Requirement of Showing Privity be Extended to Reinsurance?
The preceding discussion of the history of casualty liability insurance em-
phasizes the fact that the injured victim is the person who should benefit by
accident insurance. Thus, in discussing the need for the casualty liability insur-
ance legislation which allows a direct suit by the injured against the insurance
company, one writer has said:
98. 316 U.S. 491, 495 (1942).
99. 167 Misc. 608 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 10 N.Y.S.2d 239 (App. Div. 1933).
100. 167 Misc. at 610.
101. 136 Ohio St. 49, 23 N.E.2d 839 (1939).
102. 268 Ala. 152, 105 So.2d 43 (1958).
103. See Homan v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., 136 S.W.2d 289, 295 (Mo.
1939), where it was said: "In view of the conclusions we have reached, in this
case it is unnecessary for us to pass upon the proposition as to whether or not
Secs. 5898 and 5899, R.S. 1929 [379.195, 379.200, RSMo 19593 apply directly to
the particular contract of reinsurance under consideration."
19631
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To allow the assets of an accident policy to be appropriated by creditors
generally, when the injured party has not been paid for his injuries on the
ground that both he and they were strangers to the contract, exalts
form and violates common sense and common decency. To call the rights
of the injured party to an accident policy, where his life and limb are the
subject of the transaction, merely a 'derivative' right and therefore
'secondary' is a legal pedantry that judicial decision does not dignify.' 04
Such a statement applies with equal force to reinsurance contracts and the
parties' rights thereunder. It would seem equally a violation of "common sense"
and "common decency" to allow the assets of a reinsurance contract to be
appropriated by creditors of a reinsured company when the injured party has
not been paid for his injuries.
The reason normally given by the courts for denying a third party the right
to bring an action directly against the reinsurer is that the third party is neither
a party to the reinsurance contract nor in privity therewith. It is said, therefore,
that the third party is not a beneficiary of the contract. One might well counter
such an argument, however, by calling attention to the theory of the third party
beneficiary contract. It has been said that:
The basis of the rule permitting the beneficiary to sue has been stated to
be that 'the law, operating on the act of the parties, creates the duty,
establishes the privity, and implies the promise and obligation, on which
the action is founded.' This theory is probably more frequently stated than
any other. This, however, is merely an indirect way of saying that privity
is not necessary to enable the beneficiary to recover. By saying that the
law operating upon the acts of the parties 'establishes the privity,' the
courts really mean that the law dispenses with the requirement of privity
in the strict sense of the term.105
It is true that most of the earlier indemnity contracts were for loss of prop-
erty, both as to regular contracts of insurance and as to reinsurance. In the area
of property insurance, privity serves a useful and necessary purpose. This can be
demonstrated as follows: Suppose X insures Blackacre. Subsequently he conveys
his property to Y, keeping the policy on Blackacre in force himself. If a loss cov-
ered by the policy is suffered, X cannot recover on the policy because he has no
insurable interest.100 Further, since Y contributed nothing toward payment of the
premiums and has made no attempt to procure insurance to save himself from
loss, to allow Y to recover on the policy would be giving Y a windfall. In this in-
stance, the privity requirement serves a useful purpose, since the absence of
privity between Y and the insurance company precludes anyone from receiving a
windfall. (X can recover his premiums.)
However, the very feature which makes the privity requirement beneficial in
the property field results in an inequitable result when applied to reinsurance.
104. Laube, supra note 80, at 232.
105. 12 AM. JuR. Contracts § 278 (1938).
106. An insurable interest is "such a real and substantial interest in specific
property as will prevent a contract to indemnify the person interested against its
loss from being a mere wager policy." BLACK, LAw DicTIoNARY 942 (4th ed. 1957).
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The detrimental effect can be explained in the following manner: If a contract of
reinsurance is construed as one of indemnity against loss, then in event of insol-
vency of the reinsured before satisfaction of an injured party's judgment against
the reinsured, the reinsurer has a windfall. In such a case, neither the creditors
of the insolvent reinsured nor the injured third party can recover from the reinsur-
ance company because of the strict privity requirement. If the contract is con-
strued as a contract of indemity against liability, the general rule still denies
the third party any direct recovery against the reinsurer. Thus, if the reinsured
is insolvent, the reinsurance moneys form part of the general fund for payment
of its debts, the sums due from the reinsurer belong to the reinsured's creditors
pro rata, and the original insured has not even an equitable lien or preferred claim
upon the money due on the contract of reinsurance.107 Again, the privity rule gives
a windfall to the creditors.
It would seem that there is no justification for subordinating the social and
public interest in the welfare of an accident victim to a mechanical application of
the contractual privity requirement. The injured party is a real party in interest
to the reinsurance contract, and the saving of the parties to the reinsurance con-
tract or their creditors from loss is, from a social point of view, but an incident of
the transaction.
It is submitted that when the courts refuse to give the human factor a
dominant position, the legislatures of the various states should do so. Many state
legislatures have recognized the courts' misconceptions in persisting in the re-
quirement of privity in the case of an injured party maintaining an action against
an insurance company directly. It is thought that they should likewise nullify
those judicial decisions which declare that the property interests of the reinsured
company and its creditors outweigh the interest of society in securing to the in-
jured person compensation for the damage inflicted upon him.
B. When Should the Reinsurance Contract Be Construed
As a Third Party Beneficiary Contract?
If the courts insist upon the privity requirement and refuse to construe pre-
sent "no action" legislation as including reinsurance contracts, it is submitted that
the courts should adopt the view indicated by the Missouri courts in the Homan
and O'Hare cases-that when a reinsurance contract is found to be one insuring
against liability, then the law will supply the privity and the third party can
maintain an action against the reinsurer.
If this view be followed, it raises a question as to the validity of the distinc-
tion between contracts insuring against liability and contracts indemnifying
against loss. If the loss or liability distinction is removed, then there is a basis
for only one type of reinsurance, that being the insurance against liability contract.
It has been said that "nothing is more obvious than that the traditional
107. United States ex rel. Colonial Brick Corp. v. Federal Sur. Co., 72 F.2d
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distinction is as formal as it is artificial. In this modern commercial age when
credit is the very essence of a commercial enterprise, to assert that a liability is
not a loss is to exemplify the subtlety of the sophist."'0 8 The rationale of the sug-
gestion that the distinction should be removed can be explained in the following
manner. In a contract designated as one indemnifying against loss only, courts
generally have said that the reinsured has no rights against the reinsurer until
actual payment has been made to an insured party, because prior to the payment
no loss has been incurred. But if the reinsured has been rendered insolvent by reason
of a large number of unsatisfied claims or judgments against it, it is somewhat a
fiction to say that the reinsured has not incurred a loss. The liability, the obliga-
tion to pay, is the loss suffered. "Insolvency" has been defined as a relative condi-
tion of a man's assets and liabilities such that the assets, if all were made immedi-
ately available, would not be sufficient to discharge the liabilities. 10 9 Therefore, if
the reinsured is liable on insurance policies, whether they are liquidated or un-
liquidated claims, it has suffered a loss despite the fact that it has not yet paid
out anything. It is a loss of such magnitude, as a matter of fact, that the rein-
sured has been rendered insolvent.
This same concept can be illustrated in another way. Suppose the reinsured
is in such a position that it has to give its note to satisfy a claim or judgment.
A judgment is often a secured liability (if the judgment debtor owns an interest
in realty); a note is an unsecured liability. Although the judgment is said to be
merely a liability and not a loss until it is paid, payment by note converts it into
a loss. Thus, exchange the liability on a judgment for liability on a note, and one
suddenly finds a loss. This in itself demonstrates the fiction of any distinction be-
tween a liability and a loss contract.
Of course, the only time the distinction is of any consequence is when there
is a question as to the solvency of the reinsured. When such a question does arise,
the rights and obligations of all three parties (the policyholder or injured, the
reinsurer, and the reinsured) may be completely altered depending upon whether
the reinsured has satisfied the judgment or claim against it. It is submitted that
this fact alone should not affect the obligation of the reinsured or the rights of
the third party. No satisfactory reason can be found for leaving an injured party
or his dependents uncompensated for their suffering and expense merely because a
court finds that certain words in a reinsurance contract make the contract one of
indemnity for loss rather than a contract of insurance against liability.
C. Objections to Direct Action by the Third Party
Against the Reinsurer
Various proposals have been made in this comment for changing the present
law governing the rights of a policyholder or injured party against the reinsurer.
Some of the proposals merit more consideration than others. But how do the
arguments in favor of change measure up to the arguments against such a change?
108. Comment, 36 DicT. L. REV. 173, 182 (1931).
109. BLACK, LAw DxcTioN.aY 937 (4th ed. 1957).
[Vol. 28
19
Shrum: Shrum: Reinsurance--The Third Party's Rights against the Reinsurer
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1963
COMMENTS
Many of the arguments supporting the present law have been dealt with
previously. In addition to those arguments, several others should be considered.
The first of these is that the reinsurer and the reinsured should be free to con-
tract in any manner they see fit, including an express negation of any right in
the policyholder or injured party to maintain an action upon the reinsurance con-
tract. A proper answer to such an argument would be to point out the subordinate
position of the freedom of contract concept when the public welfare is involved.
Another argument supporting the present law is that the reinsurer serves a
function different from that of the reinsured, in that it is not the business of the
reinsurer to settle or defend against policyholder claims, and that to allow a third
party to maintain an action against the reinsurer is to subject the reinsurer to un-
warranted burdens. One answer to such an argument would be that such a burden
is properly an incident of the insurance business. The argument further loses weight
when consideration is given to the number of reinsurance contracts wherein the
reinsurer expressly reserves the right to defend and deal with the claims made
against the reinsured.
Finally, it could be argued that changing the present law would reduce the
admitted advantages of reinsurance, since the reinsurers could no longer reinsure
at the present favorable rates. As a consequence, the commercial community, and
indeed the public as a whole, would suffer. This argument loses force when the
number of insurance companies carrying reinsurance is contrasted with the num-
ber of such companies which become insolvent, thereby necessitating an action by
the policyholder or the injured party. It is submitted that the added expense to
the reinsurer of settling, defending and in general handling claims against the in-
solvent reinsured would be negligible when compared with the total amount of
reinsurance, and would have no substantial effect on the continued beneficial use
of reinsurance.
The most forceful argument against changing the law could be made by the
creditors of the reinsured. The general nature of their argument is that the policy-
holder or injured party is merely another creditor of the reinsured and should
be given no preference. However, such an argument ignores the nature of the
policyholder's or injured party's claim against the reinsured. Generally, most of
the reinsured's creditors extended credit voluntarily, knowing that the nature of
the reinsured's business was to make an injured party whole in the event the
policyholder suffers an involuntary loss. The injured tort claimant is in an entirely
different position. To classify the involuntary creditor with all the other creditors
and to give him twenty cents on the dollar (or some comparable sum) certainly
does not make him whole. The law should not be blind to needed distinctions when
they will serve a useful purpose.
V. CONCLUSION
In the early development of accident insurance, a few courts recognized the
fictitious nature of the privity requirement and the need for relief to injured
victims. However, due to the general acceptance of the privity theory, and re-
sultant hardships on injured parties, the legislatures were prodded into action.
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Today, there is little doubt that the primary purpose of various types of legisla-
tion regulating accident insurance is to afford relief to the injured victim.11°
The injured party, in seeking relief under reinsurance contracts, has generally
met with the same objection he formerly encountered when seeking relief under an
accident policy-lack of privity. At the present time, however, there are signs
that the courts are becoming less stringent with the privity requirement, especially
in Missouri. Privity is being relegated to a back seat position in other areas in the
interest of protecting the public.ll1 The trend seems to be in the same direction
in the reinsurance field.
The history of the law regarding a third party's rights under a reinsurance
contract shows a development similar to accident insurance law. This parallel
development diverged when legislatures recognized that accident insurance was for
the benefit of the injured party. It is not unlikely, however, that absent court
recognition of a third party's rights under a reinsurance contract, there will be a
similar legislative recognition of these rights in the near future.
KENNETH W. SHRUM
110, See Laube, supra note 80, at 231.
111. See Comment, Implied Warranties-The Privity Rile and Strict Liability
-The Non-Food Cases, 27 Mo. L. REv. 194 (1962).
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